The long-run relationship between house prices and income reexamined: the role of mortgage interest deduction and mortgage product innovation by Damen, Sven et al.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES 
DPS14.09 
 
APRIL 2014 
The long-run relationship 
between house prices and 
income reexamined: the  role 
of mortgage interest 
deduction and mortgage 
product innovation 
 
Sven DAMEN, Frank VASTMANS and Erik 
BUYST 
Economic History 
Faculty of Economics 
And Business 
The Long-Run Relationship between House Prices and Income
Reexamined: the Role of Mortgage Interest Deduction and
Mortgage Product Innovation.
Sven Damen, Frank Vastmans and Erik Buyst y
April 2, 2014
Abstract
In many countries, house prices are overvalued according to price-to-income ratios. We propose
that the borrowers ability to pay through a mortgage is a long-run house price fundamental and nd
convincing evidence by means of cointegration tests, granger causality, and an elasticity of house prices
with respect to ability to pay close to one. Ability to pay incorporates the e¤ect of a decreasing trend in
interest rates, changes in mortgage interest deduction and the recent innovation in mortgage products.
We apply the model to the United States of America, United Kingdom, Belgium, the Netherlands,
Sweden, Norway, Finland and Denmark. The results provide an intuitive alternative to standard house
price models.
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1 Introduction
From the mid-1990s house prices have increased in almost every developed country. The Economist (Novem-
ber 26th, 2011) notes that Never before had house prices risen so fast, for so long, in so many countries.
This sharp increase raised concern about housing bubbles and strong overvaluation in the housing market.
Assessing the possibility of overvaluation with price-to-income ratios or price-to-rent ratios would indeed
suggest that many housing markets were overvalued. Even after the crisis, The Economist (November 26th,
2011; January 4th, 2014) argues that many property markets "are still looking uncomfortably overvalued"
based on price-to-income ratios. There are several reasons why a price-to-income ratio fails to reect the
true cost of housing. The metric does not incorporate the interest rate and therefore has ignored the e¤ect
of the decreasing long-term interest rates on house prices since the 1980s. Moreover, the maximum rate at
which mortgage interest is deductible di¤ers between countries and over time. This can lead to di¤erences in
the amount that households are able to pay that a simple price-to-income ratio ignores. Finally, in this low
interest-rate environment, the standard annuity mortgage with xed periodic mortgage payments that clear
the mortgage at the end of the term has been losing popularity recently in favor of interest-only alternatives
(Scanlon, Lunde and Whitehead 2008). Mortgage product innovation can lead to higher amounts that people
are able to pay such that income alone is insu¢ cient in explaining house prices.
For these reasons, income alone cannot explain house price behavior in the long run. Whether or not a long-
run relationship exists between house prices and income continues to be a signicant debate in the literature
(Gallin 2006; Holly, Pesaran and Yamagata 2010). Income is a long-run fundamental if a cointegration test
can indicate that the residuals from a regression of house prices on income are stationary. The debate focuses
on the characteristics of the cointegration tests themselves and proposes to use panel cointegration tests as
a solution for the low power in single cointegration tests. Panel cointegration tests have however a di¤erent
null hypothesis, such that rejection should be careful interpreted (Maddala 1999; Pesaran 2012). Without
a correctly estimated long-run equation, error-correction specications may be inappropriate. Studies that
use error-correction models for house prices and income may thus produce biased estimates if house prices
and income are not cointegrated. Our goal is to estimate the long-run equilibrium properly.
Morgan (1965) has already concluded that empirical work does not need one, but a battery of measures
related to the ability to pay for housing. We adjust the income variable because most households nance
their home purchase with a standard annuity mortgage. Thus instead of using income alone we compute
a variable that can be interpreted as the ability to pay of the average household. In a rst extension we
augment the model to allow for mortgage interest deduction where we assume that the scal deduction of
mortgage interest payments leads to higher house prices through a higher amount that households are able
to pay. A second extension will be mortgage product innovations. Besides the standard annuity mortgage,
we model two groups of mortgages. The rst are the interest-only loans with repayment vehicle, such as
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endowment or savings mortgages. The borrower is able to make maximum use of the mortgage interest
deduction as the principal is only repaid at the end of the mortgage term through a repayment vehicle.
The second group contains pure interest-only loans where the borrower has no repayment vehicle. The
borrower does not accumulate equity as he only makes interest payments and hopes to renance or pay o¤
the mortgage through the sale of the house at the end of the term.
We thus assume that there is a constant fraction of income that goes to housing payments, which results
in an amount that people are able to pay based on the possibility to deduct mortgage interest payments
and innovative mortgage products. Changes in the mortgage interest deduction or mortgage characteristics
can be interpreted as regime shifts such that standard cointegration tests are unable to reject the null
hypothesis of no cointegration (Gregory and Hansen 1996) between house prices and income. Standard
cointegration tests are, however, able to reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration between house prices
and a measure of ability to pay that incorporates these regime shifts. We apply the model to a selection
of 8 OECD countries: the United States of America, United Kingdom, Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway,
Finland, Sweden and Denmark. Our results indicate that there exists a long-run relationship between house
prices and the amount that households are able to pay adjusted for mortgage interest deduction and product
innovation. Ability to pay Granger causes nominal house prices, while evidence in the other direction is
almost inexistent. The elasticity of house prices, with respect to our measure of ability to pay adjusted for
mortgage interest deduction and mortgage product innovation, is furthermore close to one, which indicates
that ability has an important economic role.
A major contribution of the paper is that the model provides an alternative toolbox to study price forming
in the housing market for a whole range of scenarios. As an example, we calculate the predicted e¤ects on
house prices from changes in the interest rate and the scal deductibility of mortgage interest.
2 Overview of the Literature
The question whether fundamentals can explain house price movements has initiated a whole debate in
the literature. The evidence on a long-run relationship between house prices and fundamentals is mixed.
Using national data, Meen (2002) reports test statistics that are unable to reject the null hypothesis of no
cointegration between house prices and fundamentals. Individual time-series cointegration tests are, however,
known to have low power when the time span of the data is small. Other studies use panel cointegration tests
in the hope for more variation in the data that will increase the power of the test (Baltagi 2008). Malpezzi
(1999) is able to reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration in a panel of 133 metropolitan areas from
1979 through 1996 using panel unit root tests described in Levin and Linn (1992). Gallin (2006), however,
pointed out that the critical values of the unit root test are incorrect when they are applied to residuals
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from the rst-stage estimation such that the null hypothesis is rejected too often. The unit root tests have
also been criticized as they assume cross-sectional independence. Gallin (2006) adopts a bootstrap approach
that allows for cross-sectional dependence and shows that none of the tests rejects the null hypothesis of no
cointegration. Holly, Pesaran and Yamagata (2010) are able to reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration
between house prices and income using the CIPS panel unit root test described in Pesaran (2007).
So far, the discussion focuses on the statistical properties of the cointegration tests themselves. Panel tests
are introduced as a solution for the low power of individual time-series cointegration tests. A crucial element
that deserves more attention is, however, the di¤erence in null hypothesis between cointegration tests that
use individual time-series and panel tests. The null in panel unit root tests says that all the series are
integrated of order one. Rejection, therefore, does not mean that all the series are stationary, as a rejection
of the null hypothesis only indicates that a signicant fraction of the series is stationary. The results of
panel unit root tests should therefore be careful interpreted (Maddala 1999; Pesaran 2012). In this paper,
we prefer to use individual time-series cointegration tests instead of the panel alternatives to make sure that
a rejection of the null hypothesis of no cointegration is not driven by a proportion of the countries in the
study, but due to our house price fundamental itself.
The main contribution of this paper is to augment income as a long-run house price fundamental as most
households nance their house purchase through a mortgage loan. The housing market indeed depends
critically on credit market conditions (Case 2008) and the link between house prices and credit lending
has recently attracted considerable interest in empirical papers (Anundsen and Jansen 2011; Brissimis and
Vlassopoulos 2009; Gimeno and Martínez-Carrascal 2010; Oikarinen 2009; Fitzpatrick and McQuinn 2007;
Gerlach and Peng 2005; Hofmann 2004; de Haas and De Greef 2000 among others). Most studies nd a
bi-directional relationship between credit and house prices and o¤er support for the view that both markets
are dependent on each other. McQuinn and OReilly (2006) propose an intuitive theoretical model of the
housing market based on the observation that most house purchases are mortgage-nanced. Hence the
amount that households are able to borrow depends on their income and interest rates  given plausible
assumptions of the fraction of income that goes to mortgage repayments and the duration of the mortgage
terms. McQuinn and OReilly apply their model to the Irish housing market and nd evidence of a long-run
relationship between house prices and the amount the average household can borrow. McQuinn and OReilly
(2007) furthermore apply this model to a panel of 16 OECD countries. Their panel cointegration tests again
indicate that a long-run relationship exists, but the authors do not report an estimate of the fraction of
countries in which the long-run relationship exists. Madsen (2012) proposes a model that explains house
prices by demand in the short run and supply in the long run. In the short run, house prices are driven
by the maximum obtainable loan and the number of house buyers. In the long run, the housing stock is
unlikely to remain constant such that the most important determinant of housing will be the replacement
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cost. His model is able to explain the 1995-2007 house price run-up in the OECD countries with declining
interest rates as one of the important factors. The model was not able to account for all the increase in the
period 2001-2006. Madsen (2012) points to nancial innovations, which lower initial mortgage payments, as
a possible explanation.
Only a few studies have examined the nancial innovation in models of residential credit and their e¤ect on
house prices. Addison-Smyth, McQuinn and OReilly (2009a) note that the period after 2000 corresponds
to a period of excess credit due to the access to interbank markets of UK credit institutions. Their results
indicate that the loan amount issued in itself caused UK house prices to increase to a level which is 30%
greater than what they would have been without access to foreign credit markets. In another study Addison-
Smyth, McQuinn and OReilly (2009b) apply their model to the Irish housing market. In addition to the
funding in the form of interbank borrowing, the authors point to the greater importance of asset securitization
since the late 1990s. This enabled nancial institutions to raise funds at a lower cost, which was used by Irish
banks to a large extent. The authors conclude that the inclusion of these nancial innovations improves the
model. Instead of using the observed loan amount, we will model the amount that borrowers are able to pay
through the specic mortgage products that are available to them. The main advantage of this approach is
that we can directly explore the theoretical expected link between economic fundamentals and house prices.
The literature that models residential credit often ignores the scal deductibility of mortgage interest pay-
ments. This has implications for the amount that people are able to borrow given their income. Vastmans
and Buyst (2011) and Vastmans, Buyst, Helgers and Damen (2013) incorporate this insight. They show that
a long-run relationship exists between house prices and the amount of money people can borrow by modeling
the evolution of the net tax relief in combination with a mortgage lengthening in 2005 for Belgium.
The ability to deduct mortgage interest is however already incorporated in the user cost literature. This
methodology is based on a rational model of asset price equilibrium where a rational homebuyer should equate
the price of a house with the present value of its future service stream (Poterba 1984). Mayer and Sinai
(2007) augment the user cost model to include proxies for low risk premia in the capital markets, ination
illusion and backwards-looking expectations of price growth. The results suggest that changes in lending
market e¢ ciency with increased subprime lending in recent years is related to excess growth in price-to-rent
ratios. The user cost threats the nancial cost as a lifetime payment of interest, which makes the measure
highly sensitive to changes in the interest rate. In reality, houses do not have an innite horizon and most
households (especially rst time home buyers) prefer to nance their home-purchase with a mortgage. The
homebuyer thus faces a nancial constraint that is dependent on the willingness of the bank to provide credit
and the specic mortgage products that are o¤ered by the mortgage provider. The homebuyer has to make a
minimum down-payment while his initial monthly mortgage payment cannot exceed the amount the bank is
willing to accept. Poterbas (1984) measure of the cost of housing services assumes complete equity nancing
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or a pure interest-only mortgage, both of which do not reect the true practice of most households in many
countries. Another drawback with user cost models is the expected capital gain. Poterbas (1984) original
assumption of perfect foresight is unrealistic. Himmelberg, Mayer and Sinai (2005) assume that homeowners
have the static expectation that house prices increase at the long-run average rate. If decreasing interest rates
in combination with innovative mortgage products, have a signicant e¤ect on house prices, the assumption
of a static expected capital gain is likely incorrect with current record-low interest rates. Even if households
are able to make rational forecasts of future house price increases, banks might be unwilling or unable to lend
the full amount if the initial value of the house is too low to guarantee a su¢ cient low loan-to-value ratio.
Glaeser, Gottlieb and Gyourko (2013) furthermore conclude that the actual empirical relationship between
house prices and interest rates is much weaker than predicted by Poterbas standard theoretical model. We
will see that this observation is in line with our framework of ability to pay where we augment the assumption
of an innite horizon and introduce a nancial constraint that limits the amount that households are able
to borrow.
3 The Model
To understand why house prices may increase with the amount that households are able to pay, we develop
a simple framework in which households maximize their utility subject to a budget constraint. We keep the
framework as simple as possible as our main goal is to gain insights into the assumptions that are needed or
the circumstances that give rise to a long-run relationship between house prices and ability to pay.
As most home purchases are mortgage-nanced, the amount of housing services the average house buyer is
able to pay is critically dependent on how much mortgage providers are willing to lend. The most important
mortgage product is the standard annuity mortgage such that the borrower has to make a xed yearly
mortgage payment (mt). The loan amount (lt) is then equal to the net present value of all future mortgage
payments and therefore depends on the mortgage payments (mt), the interest rate (it), and mortgage length
(n):
lt =
nX
k=1
mt
(1 + it)k
(1)
As the borrower has to make a downpayment (dt), the loan amount equals the house price (ph;t) minus
the down payment: lt = ph;t   dt. Substituting this in (1) and rewriting gives the xed yearly mortgage
payments (mt) of the standard annuity mortgage as a function of the house price (ph;t), downpayment (dt),
the interest rate (it), and the mortgage length (n):
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mt =
ph;t   dt
1 (1+it) n
it
 (2)
=
(1  ) :ph;t
an;i
(3)
The annuity formula

1 (1+it) n
it

calculates the net present value of n future payments given interest rate
it. In (3) we rename the annuity formula as an;i and rewrite the downpayment (dt) as a xed percentage
() of ph;t.
Consider a model in which household preferences over housing services (ht) and nonhousing consumption
(ct) are given by a standard Cobb-Douglas utility function. We assume that each period, Jt households who
meet the requirement of a minimum downpayment ratio  are willing to buy a house. Household j then
maximizes its utility with parameter  over ht and ct subject to a budget constraint.
max
ht>0;c>0
U = ht :c
1 
t (4)
s:t: : ht:
(1  ) :ph;t
an;i
+ ct:pc;t = Yt (5)
Our budget constraint di¤ers from the existing literature as the price of housing services (ph;t) only enters
through the mortgage payments. The budget constraint thus says that the sum of yearly mortgage payments
and consumption expenditures should equal income (Yt): households are not able to spend more than they
earn. We assume, however, that households exhaust their budget constraint as they are in competition
with other households for the scarce housing services. Maximization of (4) subject to (5) yields the optimal
amount of housing services (ht ):
ht =
Yt
1   :an;i:
1
ph;t
Summing over the Jt individual demands for housing services, one arrives at the aggregate demand for
housing services (Ht ):
Ht =
XJt
j=1
ht (ph;t; an;i; Yt)
= Jt|{z}
Extensive
:
Yt
1   :an;i:
1
ph;t| {z }
Intensive demand
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We make a distinction between demand on the extensive and intensive margin. The former denotes the
demand from an additional household that would like to become homeowner and the latter denotes the
amount of housing services each household buys. In equilibrium, the market clearing condition ensures that
aggregate housing demand (Ht ) equals the aggregate supply of housing services (Q
S
t ): H

t = Q
S
t . Solving
for the house price (ph;t) then yields
ph;t =
Jt
QSt
:
Yt
1   :an;i (6)
=
Jt
QSt
:At (7)
where we rename Yt1  :an;i to the households ability to pay At. The house price is thus a function of a ratio
of the demand on the extensive margin over the supply of housing services, multiplied with the households
ability to pay. Equation (7) indicates that house prices should be cointegrated with ability to pay if the ratio
(Jt=QSt ) is constant over time. Similar assumptions are made in the existing literature: Head, Lloyd-Ellis
and Sun (forthcoming) assume that available land grows at an exogenous rate equal to the growth rate of the
population in the long run, which implies that the total stock of land relative to the aggregate population
is a constant in equilibrium. Growth in the number of households is thus absorbed by growth in the supply
of aggregate housing through housing construction such that the ratio Jt=QSt is constant over time and a
long-run relationship between house prices and ability to pay exists. Our current framework therefore does
not necessarily require an inelastic housing supply.
A long-run relationship between house prices and income does not have to exist according to equation (6) as
changes in the interest rate induce changes in the annuity formula (an;i). These changes could be interpreted
as structural breaks (or parameter instability), such that standard cointegration tests are unable to reject
the null hypothesis of no cointegration between house prices and income (Gregory and Hansen 1996). Notice
that a similar argument can be made for the long-run relationship between house prices and ability to pay:
if the ratio Jt=QSt is not constant over time, standard cointegration tests would be unable to reject the null
hypothesis of no cointegration. Whether or not such a long-run relationship exists is an empirical question.
The framework we describe is, however, not the only situation that gives rise to a long-run relationship
between house prices and householdsability to pay. Many borrowers face a borrowing limit as mortgage
payments are often limited to a certain fraction of income (for example:  = 0:28). If preferences for housing
are such that households are willing to spend more on housing than the borrowing limit ( > ), a binding
borrowing constraint for the representative household gives rise to a relationship between house prices and
ability to pay. A similar assumption that households exhaust their debt capacity was used in a study by
Makarov and Plantin (2013) for subprime lending.
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Hereafter, we augment the standard annuity mortgage to allow for mortgage interest deduction. Furthermore,
we model interest-only loans with and without repayment vehicles. These innovative mortgage products
result in a di¤erent budget constraint such that the households are able to pay more than with a standard
annuity mortgage. When we use the term ability to pay adjusted for mortgage interest deduction and
mortgage characteristics, "adjusted ability to pay", or notation xi;t we refer to the weighted average of all
the mortgages for the country of interest. The weights are the share of the particular mortgage product as
a percentage of all mortgages.
3.1 Standard Annuity Mortgage Adjusted for Mortgage Interest Deduction
Due to the availability of mortgage interest deduction in many countries, the ability to pay of the borrower
can be higher than At from the previous section. He can spend (a part of) the mortgage interest deduction
to increase his yearly payments from Yt to Yt+ t:It, and ultimately, the borrowing limit. In the rst years
of an annuity mortgage, the interest payments will be higher and the borrower can deduct more interest. In
the later years, his capital payments will be higher and he will deduct less. Hence it is reasonable to assume
that that the average amount of interest deducted (It) is capitalized into house prices such that his ability
to pay increases to1 :
A
0
t =

Yt +  t:It
1  

an;i (8)
The rate at which the borrower can deduct interest is equal to  t. We assume that the households have
static expectations regarding future tax rates and rules. The average yearly interest paid (It) is equal to:
It =
1
n
(
 
Yt +  t:It

:n| {z }
Total mortgage payments
  (Yt +  t:It):an;i| {z }
Loan principal
)
(9)
Solve (9) for It and substitute this in (8) to get:
A
0
t =

Yt
1  
 
1
1   t:
 
1  an;in
! an;i (10)
This extension allows us to interpret the possible e¤ects of the mortgage interest deduction on the ability to
pay for housing. For a 20-year mortgage at an interest rate of 5%, a ceteris paribus increase in the maximum
1We assume that households use the average amount of interest paid (It) to increase mortgage payments as a proxy for their
willingness to smooth consumption (instead of the net present value of the scal advantage).
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rate at which mortgage interest is deductible from 0% to 30% would lead to an increase in ability to pay of
13%. An increase in the tax rate from 0% to 50% would even cause the ability to pay to increase by 23%.
3.2 Interest-Only Mortgage with Repayment Vehicle
An endowment mortgage or savings mortgage is an interest-only loan where the principal is repaid at the
end of the mortgage term through a repayment vehicle. The borrower pays only the interest and makes
payments to an endowment policy. The savings mortgage often takes the form of a life insurance that pays
the proceeds at the end of the mortgage. If the repayment vehicle is su¢ cient to repay the loan at the end
of the mortgage term, this mortgage type is not riskier than the standard annuity mortgage. The purpose
of the savings mortgage is to make maximum use of the mortgage interest deduction. Because he is able to
deduct all the interest over the whole mortgage duration, he is able to increase his ability to pay to:
A
0
t =
 
Yt +  t:it:(1  ):A0t
1  
!
an;i (11)
Solve (11) for A
0
t to get:
A
0
t =

Yt
1  

1
1   t:it:an;i

an;i (12)
We can see that without the ability to deduct interest ( t = 0), this mortgage wouldnt exist as it would be
equivalent to a standard annuity mortgage. For a 20-year mortgage at a 5% interest rate, the ability to pay
would be 23% higher in comparison to a standard annuity loan when interest is deductible at 30%. At even
higher rates of 50%, the ability to pay would be 45% higher than a standard annuity loan.
3.3 Interest-Only Mortgage without Repayment Vehicle
Another mortgage product that lowers monthly payments is the pure interest-only loan. The borrower only
pays interest throughout the whole mortgage duration. At the end of the mortgage term, the borrower has to
repay the entire principal. This product di¤ers from the interest-only loans with repayment vehicle because
the borrower does not accumulate equity. They hope to renance or pay o¤ the mortgage through the sale
of the house at the end of the term. One reason why interest-only mortgages have become popular in recent
years is due to the low interest payments (Scanlon, Lunde and Whitehead 2008). At low interest rates, the
percentage of principal repayments are high and hence the di¤erence between mortgages with and without a
repayment vehicle becomes larger. Instead of repaying principal, the borrower can decide to spend his yearly
payments on interest payments such that Yt = it:A
0
t (assuming no down payment). If the borrower is able
to deduct interest his yearly payments can increase from Yt to Yt +  t:it:A
0
t which has to equal the yearly
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interest for the mortgage:
Yt +  t:it:A
0
t = it:A
0
t (13)
Solve (13) for A
0
t to get:
A
0
t =
Yt
it:(1   t) (14)
Equation (14) is equivalent to the model by de Vries and Boelhouwer (2009), that seeks to identify a long-run
equilibrium between interest payments and household income in the Netherlands from 1978 to 2008. We will,
however, use a weighted average of the di¤erent mortgage types. Ability to pay from a pure interest-only
loan increases signicantly at lower interest rates in comparison to other mortgage types. Ability to pay is
indeed 157% higher in comparison to a standard 20-year annuity mortgage with an interest rate of 5%. In a
country where interest payments are deductible at lower tax rates, the ability to pay is much lower. Ability
to pay is only83% higher in comparison to a standard annuity mortgage when the maximum taxable value
of the tax relief equals 30%. When interest payments are deductible at lower tax rates, the ability to pay
increases less strongly when interest rates decrease which could explain the relative late use of pure interest
only loans in Denmark and the United Kingdom in comparison to the Netherlands during the last decade.
4 Data
As time series for the maximum rate at which mortgage interest is scally deductible and the mortgage
shares are not available, we have to construct them ourselves. Because we need to construct them for
a relatively long time span, we make a selection of countries that are relatively well documented in the
literature. Our analysis includes 8 OECD countries in which it is possible to deduct mortgage interest or
where the maximum rate at which interest is deductible has changed over time. The countries of interest
are Belgium (BEL), Netherlands (NLD), United Kingdom (GBR), United States of America (USA), Sweden
(SWE), Norway (NOR), Finland (FIN), and Denmark (DNK). The sample includes countries where the
scal advantage has increased (BEL), remained constant (USA, NLD), partially diminished (SWE, NOR,
FIN, DNK), and has been completely phased out (GBR). Furthermore, the sample includes countries where
interest-only mortgages have increased (NLD, DNK), decreased (GBR), or both increased and decreased
(USA) in popularity.
Marginal tax rates were taken from the CEP-OECD institutions data set (Nickell 2006) for the period 1980-
1999 and the OECD Taxing Wage Statistics from 2000 onwards. They are based on a principal earner who
is married with two children earning the average wage with a spouse earning 67% of the average wage. The
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yearly data are linearly interpolated to construct quarterly series2 . In several countries, tax reforms have
limited the rate at which mortgage interest is deductible over time. We therefore limit the taxable value of
the tax relief according to the descriptions in the next section. In addition, we construct weights for the
di¤erent mortgage types based on country reports or academic articles and interpolate for unknown periods.
We assume a payment-to-income ratio () equal to 30% and a down-payment ratio () equal to 20%. Our
results are independent of these assumptions as they only linearly transform our measure of ability to pay
(assuming no pure interest-only loan). Mortgage maturity (n) is set equal to 20 years unless otherwise
specied in the next section.
The OECD database provides nominal house price indices, aggregate household real disposable income (which
we transform to nominal income per capita), population and 10-year government bond rates. The source
and description of the nominal house price indices is given in Table A.1 in the appendix. In our analysis, we
will use 10-year government bond rates for all countries, irrespective of the popularity of xed or variable
mortgages. This is in contrast to McQuinn & OReilly (2007) who use short and long-term interest rates
depending on the popularity in the country. At rst sight, lower short-term interest rates indicates that one
can borrow more. On the other hand, a high spread indicates that it is very likely that rates will increase in
the future. A prudent homebuyer will understand this risk and therefore it is not certain whether or not the
term spread (i.e. the di¤erence between the long-term and short-term rates) is capitalized into house prices.
We also prefer to use the 10 year government bond over mortgage rates because the former is consistently
measured over time and across countries3 . The use of long term bond rates is furthermore widespread in the
literature such that our results are comparable to the existing literature.
5 Country Comparison: Mortgage Interest Deduction and Mort-
gage Characteristics
The mortgage interest deduction has been limited over time in the United Kingdom (Hendershott, Pryce
and White 2002). From 1974 the deduction was restricted such that only mortgages below the £ 25000
threshold could deduct interest. From 1983, this limit was raised to £ 30000 and this amount was never
adjusted to compensate for increasing house prices. The maximum rate at which interest could be deducted
was limited to 25% from 1992 in comparison to maximum marginal income tax rates of 40% in the pre-
1992 period. This limit decreased further to 20% (1994), 10% (1995), and 0% (1999). We use data from
the Council of Mortgage Lenders (as presented in the Mortgage Market Review (2011) of the Financial
2As we are restricted by a relatively short time span of 30 years of data, we use quarterly data to increase the frequency
of the data which may yield considerable power gains (Zhou 2001). We expect the gains from the increased frequency to be
higher than the loss of the linear interpolation of the tax rates and mortgage shares as these series evolve slowly over time. A
robustness check with yearly data is available upon request.
3For Belgium alone we would have to combine three di¤erent measured time series to construct a mortgage rate from 1980Q1
to 2009Q4. A robustness check with mortgage rates is available upon request for Belgium, the Netherlands and the United
States of America. The results do not alter our conclusions.
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Services Authority) for the relative share of the di¤erent mortgage types. In the early 1980s, the interest-
only mortgage with repayment vehicle became a mainstream contract. Borrowers with so-called endowment
mortgages did not repay any capital but made payments to an endowment policy that would be su¢ cient
to repay the loan at the end of the term. Borrowers were thus able to make maximum use of the interest
deductibility over the whole mortgage term. As the mortgage interest deduction was limited over time, this
mortgage decreased in popularity. According to the Mortgage Market Review (2009, 2011) there is, however,
a recent increase in pure interest only-loans from 9% in 2002 up to 24% in 2007. Since 2007, the share of
interest-only mortgages has declined sharply such that pure interest-only loans were only 12% of total sales
in 2009. We assume an average mortgage term of 25 years. The Mortgage Market Review (2009) indicates
that the loan-to-value ratio at time of house purchase is approximately 80% in 2008.
In the United States of America the mortgage interest deduction is one of the largest tax expenditures.
Owner-occupiers can deduct mortgage interest from income at their marginal tax rate on the rst $1 million
of debt used to acquire, construct, or improve a house. The United States has a high proportion of long-
term xed-rate mortgages (Lea 2010). The average mortgage term in the period 1980-2009 is equal to 27
years according to data from the Federal Housing Finance Agencys Monthly Interest Rate Survey. Over
this period, the average loan-to-value ratio was equal to 76% according to the same data. Mortgages with
a¤ordability features such as interest-only or payment-option loans (requiring even lower mortgage payments)
increased from only 2% of origination share in 2003 to almost 20% in 2005 according to a report from the
Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University4 . The share of interest-only and payment-option
loans decreased to 11% in 2007 and completely disappeared by 2009.
In Belgium (Van der Reysen, Vanrijckeghem and Vlasselaerts 2007) the mortgage tax relief before 2005 was
mainly a capital deduction. Households were thus able to reduce taxable income dependent on the amount
of capital the borrower repaid. Borrowers thus had no incentive to take mortgages with longer maturities as
the scal advantage was higher in the nal years of the mortgage. To our knowledge, Belgium is the only
country in the world where capital payments were deductible. In practice, the tax relief was around 2500
euro per household for a mortgage of 20 years in 2004 (e.g. Valenduc 2008 cited in Vastmans and Buyst
2011). The amount deductible was thus limited per dwelling in contrast to the new mortgage tax relief since
2005 (woonbonus) that is limited per person. In 2005, the tax relief was equal to 1870 euro per person. In the
rst 10 years, this amount was increased by 620 euro. These amounts are indexed such that the maximum
allowed tax relief was 2770 euro per person in 2010. For the majority of households, the tax relief thus more
than doubled from 2500 euro per household in 2004 to 4980 euro in 2005. During the whole period, this tax
relief was deductible at the marginal tax rate of the borrower. It has been shown by Plaut (1986), among
others, that a decrease in the mortgage interest rate decreases the rate of amortization. Cheaper mortgages
4See Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University. 2008. The State of the Nations Housing 2008: Figure 19, page
18.
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are thus repaid less quickly. Vastmans, Buyst, Helgers, and Damen (2013) conrm that the system of capital
deductions before 2005 provided an incentive to borrow with a shorter maturity as the scal advantage was
tilted to the end of the maturity. As the tax reform allows households to deduct mortgage interest since 2005,
households borrow on longer terms since then (Vastmans and Buyst 2011). We therefore assume that the
mortgage term increased from 20 years (before 2005) to 25 years in 2005. The appendix provides additional
information on how we model the ability to pay in Belgium given its unique system of scal advantages for
homeowners. The typical loan-to-value ratio for a rst-time house buyer is equal to 80% according to ECB
(2009).
Homeowners in the Netherlands can deduct interest payments at their marginal tax rate. Tax relief for
second homes was abolished in 2001, and deductibility is limited to a 30-year period (Scanlon and Whitehead
2004). There are some signicant changes in mortgage characteristics since the 1990s. During the last two
decades interest-only mortgages (rst savings-mortgages with repayment vehicle, later interest-only loans
without repayment vehicle) increased in popularity. The share of interest-only loans was only 33% in 1989
(of which only 10% had no repayment vehicle), but was able to gain popularity such that 89% of mortgages
in 2009 were interest-only (of which 50% had no repayment vehicle). We use data from the Housing Needs
Surveys as presented in Rouwendal (2007) and the Dutch Housing Survey (2009) to construct the mortgage
shares. The mortgage interest deduction is an important issue in Dutch policy debates. Policy makers decided
that from 2014, the maximum rate at which mortgage interest is deductible will decrease by 0.5% every year
until it is completely abolished in 2040. Since 2013, only borrowers with standard annuity mortgages and
maturity of maximum 30 years are allowed to deduct mortgage interest. The framework allows us to study
the impact of these changes in the mortgage interest deduction and mortgage characteristics on house prices.
The accelerating ination in the 1970s transformed the e¤ective Swedish housing subsidies into huge general
subsidies to housing consumption (Englund, Hendershott and Turner 1995; Turner and Whitehead 2002).
Not only could they fully deduct mortgage interest payments, most new housing units were entitled to
interest-subsidized loans and there was a scheme of housing allowances for low-income families with children.
Since the 1985 reform, the tax rate applicable to interest deduction was the same for all households. Interest
payments can only be deducted at a maximum rate of 50 percent from 1985 to 1988 and declined to 47
percent in 1989, 40 percent in 1990, and to 30 percent since 1991 (Berger, Englund, Hendershott and Turner
2000). Before 1985, we assume a tax rate of 50%, but the results do not change when we use higher marginal
tax rates of 60% or 70%.
Due to the 1987 tax reform in Denmark, borrowers were no longer able to deduct interest payments at
the highest marginal tax rates (up to 70%). The taxable value of tax relief on interest decreased to 50%.
The 1993 and 1998 tax reforms further reduced the tax rates at which interest payments could be deducted.
This meant a continued decrease in the taxable value of tax relief on interest until it was equal to 33% for
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all taxpayers in 2001. It was expected that the tax adjustments of the "Whitsun-package" could dampen
the real estate market and that these e¤ects would be seen from the adoption in the summer of 19985 . A
rational household will take into account the expected reduction in taxable value. As a proxy, we therefore
assume that householdswillingness to pay increases only up to a borrowing limit computed from a marginal
taxable value of 33% from 1999. All other yearly marginal tax rates are taken from the Danish Ministry of
Taxation (at the highest tax brackets)6 . Since 2003, interest-only products were allowed. This innovation
was able to gain popularity such that 31,5% of mortgages were interest-only in 2005. Two years later, this
share increased further to 43% of owner-occupiers outstanding mortgages (Scanlon & Whitehead 2008).
Yearly data on the weights of the interest-only loans were taken from the annual reports of the Association
of Danish Mortgage Banks.
Norway and Finland experienced tax reforms in 1992 and 1993, respectively (de Vries 2007). Since then,
mortgage interest is deductible at proportional rates of 28% in Norway and 29% in Finland. Deductions
were possible at the progressive marginal tax rates before the tax reforms. The changes in the Nordic tax
systems are characterized as a move to a dual income taxation which separates the taxation of capital income
from the taxation of other sources of income (Sørensen 1994). The typical loan-to-value ratio for a rst-time
house buyer is equal to 81% in Finland according to ECB (2009).
6 Empirical Results
6.1 The Long-run Relationship
If two time series achieve stationarity after di¤erencing (i.e. they are integrated of order one), but a linear
combination is already stationary, these time series are said to be cointegrated according to Engle and
Granger (1987). In the short run, deviations can occur from the long-run relationship, but in the long run
the dependent variable will converge to the fundamental value. If two variables that are integrated of order
one are not cointegrated, the regression results are spurious such that there exists no interpretation of the
estimated coe¢ cients. Table 1 presents results for Phillips-Perron stationarity tests (including an intercept)
of nominal house prices and ability to pay in di¤erences. The null hypothesis of no stationarity in di¤erences
is rejected in every country at the 10% signicance level.7 All variables are thus integrated of order one and
cointegration tests can be applied to ensure that a possible relationship between house prices and our measure
of ability to pay is not spurious. We follow the guidance of Haug (1996) and use more than one cointegration
test to deal with the trade-o¤ between power and size distortions. He advises to use the Philips & Ouliaris
5See the Annex of the Convergence Program (1998-1999) from Denmark in accordance with the Council Regula-
tion (EC) No 1466/97 of 7 July 1997: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_nance/economic_governance/sgp/pdf/20_scps/1998-
99/01_programme/dk_1998-12-01_cp_annex_en.pdf.
6See for example http://www.skm.dk/skatteomraadet/talogstatistik/tidsserieoversigter/4638.html.
7Phillips-Perron tests do not reject the null hypothesis of no stationarity (with and without trend) of the time series in levels
(results not reported here).
15
(1990) test statistics, that seem to have higher power when the researcher deals with weakly exogenous
regressors. Because the test statistics are non-parametric with respect to nuisance parameters, they allow
for a very wide range of time series models in which there is a unit root (Phillips and Perron 1988). In
addition he recommends to use the ADF test as this is one of the tests with the least size distortions. We
report two ADF test statistics: the rst is the standard t-statistic, the second test statistic is based directly
on the autocorrelation coe¢ cient after a correction such that the limiting distribution does not depend on
nuisance parameters controlling serial correlation (Hayashi 2000). Optimal lag length is determined by the
Schwarz and Akaike Information Criteria.
Tables 2 and 3 provide test results for the null hypothesis of no cointegration according to the test statistics
described in the previous paragraph and in the appendix. Table 2 provides test results for the null hypothesis
of no cointegration between nominal house prices and ability to pay measured with a standard annuity
mortgage. At the 10% signicance level, Norway and the United States of America are the only countries
where we can reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration between nominal house prices and ability to pay.
In all other countries we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration. The absence of cointegration
in most countries indicates that the standard annuity mortgage is insu¢ cient in explaining the evolution of
house prices.
To capture the e¤ect of mortgage interest deduction and nancial innovation, we dene the variable ability
to pay adjusted for mortgage interest deduction and mortgage characteristics. This is a weighted average
of the ability to pay with the annuity and interest-only mortgages where mortgage interest deduction is
allowed. The weights equal the share of the particular mortgage as percentage of all mortgages. We plot the
nominal house prices and adjusted ability to pay for each country in Figure A.1. The test results in table 3
indicate that we can reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration between house prices and adjusted ability
to pay from 1980Q1 to 2009Q4 in all countries except Sweden. The inability to reject the null hypothesis
of no cointegration in Sweden is likely due to the extraordinary asset price boom caused by the deregulated
credit markets since 1985 (Englund 1999). This was followed by the Swedish banking crisis in the early
1990s that triggered a downward spiral in real estate prices until the mid-1990s. An important nding is
that a long-run relationship between nominal house prices and adjusted ability to pay does exist from 1995
to 2009, when the Swedish market recovered.
Figure 1 presents the percentage change in adjusted ability to pay at time t due to a change in a specic
variable from 1980 to t conditional on the other variables at time t. Due to the conditioning on the other
variables at time t, the inuence of a variable can change over time without a change in the variable itself.
The e¤ect of each determinant is thus dependent on the value of the other variables. Changes in "Mortgage
Interest Deduction" refer to the e¤ect of the marginal tax rate at which interest is deductible and the
expansion of the scal advantage for homeowners in Belgium. "Interest Rate" refers to the e¤ect of changes
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in the nominal long-term interest rates. "Mortgage Characteristics" includes the changes in the share of
specic mortgage types and the lengthening of mortgage terms since 2005 in Belgium.
The gure shows the downward pressure on adjusted ability to pay in Sweden due to the reductions in
the rate at which mortgage interest was deductible. Swedish house prices bottomed out in the mid-1990s
when decreasing interest rates caused an upward pressure on the adjusted ability to pay. The evolution in
Sweden is very di¤erent from the United Kingdom, where the decrease in mortgage interest deduction (and
contemporaneous decrease in the endowment mortgage) was counteracted by decreasing interest rates. The
simultaneous downward pressure on house prices due to the phased out mortgage interest deduction and
upward pressure due to decreasing interest rates caused a comparatively minor change in house prices. The
complete abolition in the United Kingdom can thus be seen as a perfectly timed counter-cyclical Keynesian
policy.
The use of the di¤erent mortgage types in the model is an important factor in the evolution of house prices in
several countries. The popularity of the endowment mortgage in the 1980s and the increasing share of pure
interest-only loans seem to improve the model signicantly for the United Kingdom. In the Netherlands,
the run-up in house prices since the mid-1990s was mainly driven by an increasing share of interest-only
mortgages, whereas the recent increase in house prices in Belgium was caused by a simultaneous increase
in the scal advantage for homeowners and a lengthening in the mortgage term (see Figure 1). In all these
countries, we are unable to reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration if we do not adjust our measure of
ability to pay for specic mortgage characteristics. The United States of America is the only country where
we do not have to model the pure interest-only loans to reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration, but the
p-values decrease if we do adjust for these mortgage characteristics. The results indicate that it is necessary
to model changes in mortgage interest deduction and specic mortgage product innovations to explain house
price behavior since the 1980s.
We assume static expectations regarding future tax rates and rules8 . Households thus naively expect the
tax rates to be maintained in the future. We make this simplifying assumption as it is impossible to know
the exact path of householdsexpectations over time. As a robustness check, we assume that future tax
rules in the United Kingdom and Denmark are announced at the start of the tax reforms in 1992 and 1987,
respectively, and that households are willing to pay, within their ability, calculated from the tax rate at the
end of the reforms (0% in the United Kingdom and 30% in Denmark)9 . In the United Kingdom we are
then able to reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration at even lower signicance levels. The results for
8An exception is the 1989-2001 period in Denmark where we assume that households are only willing to pay a borrowing
limit calculated with the 2001-taxrate of 30% (see previous section).
9For evidence that borrowers in the United Kingdom were able to (partially) know future tax paths see
Jones, R. (1999). "Time is right for mortgage relief to end," Guardian, Retrieved May 29, 2013, from
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/1999/mar/10/rupertjones?INTCMP=SRCH
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Denmark are similar to the baseline case. The results thus indicate that house prices incorporate expectations
of future tax reforms.
6.2 Granger Causality
Our results indicate that a long-run relationship between nominal house prices and the ability to pay exists.
For the interpretation of the results, we study the temporal ordering of the variables by means of Granger
causality tests (Granger 1969). Because there exists a long-run relationship between nominal house prices
and adjusted ability to pay we can apply the Granger causality tests to the I(1) series. In the bivariate
cointegrated case, the test has an asymptotic 2(p) distribution, where p is equal to the order of the vector
autoregressive (VAR) process (Lütkepohl and Reimers 1992). We apply the SIC to select the optimal order
p, which is shown to be consistent under quite general conditions (Lütkepohl 2005). The results in tables 4
and 5 are in favor of the view that changes in the ability to pay Granger cause changes in house prices and
not the other way around. At the 5% signicance level, adjusted ability to pay Granger causes house prices
in every country. In the other direction, the e¤ects seem less strong, suggesting that higher house prices
do not stimulate mortgage product innovation in order to keep housing a¤ordable. As we are unable to
nd a long-run relationship in Sweden for the full sample period, the results for Sweden should be carefully
interpreted10 . An explanation for the mutual dependence in Belgium might be found in the indexation
of nominal wages and the limits of the scal advantage. Due to an indexation with lagged ination a bi-
directional relationship in the short run might arise as borrowers can anticipate future indexations in wages
and the limits of the scal advantage.
The causality from ability to pay to house prices seems surprising given the large empirical literature that
reports a mutual dependence of mortgage lending and property prices or a strong positive e¤ect of property
prices on bank lending (see Hofmann 2004 among others). These studies report however a relationship that
is often conditional on economic fundamentals (interest rate, income) such that the "nancial acceleration
mechanism" (Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist 1999) is studied and not the e¤ect of economic fundamentals
through mortgage lending. The nancial acceleration mechanism states that increased house prices will raise
the value of the borrowerscollateral such that they are able to borrow more, which could indeed explain
deviations from our long-run relationship between house prices and ability to pay.
6.3 Economic Importance
6.3.1 The elasticity of house prices with respect to ability to pay
To study the economic importance of ability to pay and its components we have to estimate the cointegration
vector of house prices and ability to pay. The OLS estimator would yield a consistent estimate of the
10 If we apply the Granger causality tests to the series in di¤erences for Sweden, we are unable to reject the null hypothesis
of no Granger causality in either way if the optimal number of lags is selected with the SIC.
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cointegration vector, but is subject to a nite sample bias and the OLS standard errors will be inappropriate
(Stock 1987, Zivot and Wang 2006). We therefore follow the approach of Stock and Watson (1993) and
augment the static ordinary least squares estimator (SOLS) to include q leads and p lags of the regressor
in di¤erences (
Pp
z= q i;zxi;t z) to construct the dynamic ordinary least squares estimator (DOLS). The
DOLS model can be expressed as
ph;i;t = i;0 + i;1:xi;t +
pX
z= q
i;z:xi;t z + ui;t (15)
where ph;i;t is the nominal house price, xi;t our measure of ability to pay, and ui;t a stationary process (where
subscripts i and t denote the country and time, respectively). We estimate equation (15) separately for each
country. Newey-West HAC standard errors may be used for valid inference on i;1 (Zivot and Wang, 2006).
Hayakawa and Kurozumi (2006) show that the DOLS estimator without leads substantially outperforms the
DOLS estimator with leads and lags in case leads are unnecessary. We therefore estimate equation (15)
without leads (q = 0), but provide robustness checks with both leads and lags in the appendix. The optimal
number of lags is selected by the Schwarz and Akaike Information Criteria with a maximum of 8 quarters.
However, because our data consists of house price indices and not the actual house price itself, the estimated
parameter ^i;1 is di¢ cult to interpret. We are however able to interpret the estimated parameter ^i;1 if we
compute the elasticity of house prices with respect to ability to pay ("i;t) as follows:
"i;t =
dp^h;i;t
dxi;t
:
xi;t
p^h;i;t
= ^i;1:
xi;t
p^h;i;t
=
^i;1:xi;t
^i;0 + ^i;1:xi;t
where p^h;i;t is the predicted value of the house price calculated with the consistent estimate of i;1 in equation
(15): p^h;i;t = ^i;0+^i;1:xi;t. The elasticity thus measures the percentage change in house prices from a change
in ability to pay of 1%.
An alternative solution would be to estimate (15) with a logarithmic transformation of the house price index
and our measure of ability to pay, such that the estimated coe¢ cient can be interpreted as an elasticity.
However, as Granger and Hallman (1991) point out, the existence of cointegration between two variables
does not imply cointegration between any non-linear transformation of the variables. We are indeed unable
to reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration between the logarithmic transformed variables (results not
reported here). An intuitive explanation can be found in the interpretation of the shock in our specication.
19
Shocks that drive house prices temporarily from their long-run relationship are thus not proportional to the
house price itself (multiplicative), but became relatively smaller over time in our current time span according
to our results. This nding might be specic to the time span of this study, or a possible explanation might
be a more e¢ cient market over time with smaller relative shocks (and constant absolute shocks). In any
case, it is an important nding, given that it is standard practice to apply a logarithmic transformation in
the existing literature11 .
The estimated elasticities, calculated with the ability to pay in the last quarter of 2009 of country i ("i;tjt =
2009Q4), are presented in Table 6. The results where the optimal number of lags are selected with the Schwarz
information criterion indicate that the smallest elasticity is found in Finland: a one percentage increase in
ability to pay, increases the house price by 0.82 percent. The largest elasticity is found in Denmark, where a
one percentage increase in ability to pay increases the house price by 1.16 percent. The estimated elasticities
are remarkably close to one, and even statistically indistinguishable from one in the United Kingdom and
Norway. The estimated elasticity in Sweden is also statistically indistinguishable from one, although the
coe¢ cient is probably spurious as we are unable to reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration in the full
time span. The results are robust in the use of the Akaike information criterion for optimal lag selection
(reported in Table 6) or using both leads and lags in the DOLS estimator (reported in the Table A.3 in the
appendix).
An inspection of the relative error terms in Figure A.4 indicates that the number of house price cycles
around our long-run equilibrium is rather limited. Deviations from the equilibrium may therefore have a
large inuence on the estimated cointegration vector in the relatively short time span of less than 30 years.
Future research that would replicate our study when a longer time span is available might nd elasticities
closer to one as these estimates would be less inuenced by housing cycles. Given the time span of the
available data, a solution would be to estimate a Mean Group Estimator (Pesaran and Smith 1995) of the
elasticities that could cancel out country-specic cyclical uctuations. The Mean Group Estimator is a
simple mean (Pesaran and Smith 1995):
" = N 1
NX
i=1
"i;t
with variance
11The logarithmic transformation is often applied to stabilize the variance of a time series (Lütkepohl and Xu 2012) or to
linearize an exponential growing trend (Ermini and Hendry 2008). Standard unit root tests are, however, known to be non-
robust to inappropriate transformations and the usual practice of taking logs is not always warranted (Kramer and Davies 2002,
Franses and Koop 1998).
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dvar(") = 1
N (N   1)
NX
i=1
("i;t   ")2
The mean group estimator of all countries indicates that the elasticity is 0.99 or 0.98 when the optimal
number of lags is selected with respectively the Schwarz and Akaike information criterion. If we exclude
Sweden, the mean group elasticity equals 0.99 with a standard error of 0.05. A one percentage increase in
ability to pay thus increases house prices with 0.99 percent on average in our sample of OECD countries.
6.3.2 Predicted impact of the interest rate and mortgage interest deduction on house prices
Our results indicate that ability to pay has an economically important role on house prices. To get a sense of
the economic role of the components of ability to pay we calculate the predicted e¤ects on house prices and
ability to pay from changes in interest rates and a reduction in the scal deductibility of mortgage interest.
The rst four columns in Table 7 indicate the percentage increase in ability to pay (xi;t=xi;t) and the house
price (ph;i;t=ph;i;t) due to a one percentage point increase in the interest rate of 2009Q4. The percentage
increase in house prices (ph;i;t=ph;i;t) is calculated as a multiplication of the percentage increase in ability
to pay (xi;t=xi;t) and the estimated elasticities ("i;t) from Table 6 (DOLS SIC). The semi-interest elasticity
has the highest value in the Netherlands: an increase in the interest rate of one percentage point would
decrease ability to pay by almost 17% and house prices by more than 18%. The high sensitivity to changes
in interest rates is not remarkable, given the high share of pure interest only loans which implies semi-interest
elasticities similar to those from Poterbas user cost approach. Previous studies in the Netherlands indeed
impose models similar to the user cost methodology (see Vries and Boelhouwer 2009 among others) and the
high (and non-linear) sensitivity to changes in interest rate is also conrmed empirically by McQuinn and
OReilly (2007).
The semi-interest elasticity in the United Kingdom is also high relative to other countries. In the literature
(see The International Monetary Fund 2004 among others), the relative high sensitivity of house prices is
often attributed to a higher share of borrowers with adjustable rate mortgages. To the best of our knowledge,
we are the rst to explain the relative high semi-interest elasticity in the United Kingdom with mortgage
characteristics other than the high share of adjustable rate mortgages. In our framework, the UKs house
prices are more sensitive to changes in interest rates due to the presence of interest-only loans and the
inability to deduct mortgage interest in recent years.
Gallin (2008) shows that the relationship between the real user cost and subsequent price adjustments in
the USA is small. Also Glaeser, Gottlieb and Gyourko (2013), and Campbell, Davis, Gallin and Martin
(2009) report that changes in interest rates cannot explain the large house price movements. These studies,
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however, document the role of real interest rates. Our study focuses on the nominal interest rate due to its
important role in the borrowing constraint. The estimates for the semi-interest elasticity of house prices in
the USA indicate that an increase of one percentage point in nominal interest rates decrease nominal house
prices by 7.24%. From 1980Q1 till 2009Q4, nominal interest rates fell by 8.5 percentage points, such that a
large part of the increases in house prices since 1980 can be attributed to a decrease in the nominal interest
rate (see also Figure 1).
An important policy question is the degree of capitalization of the mortgage interest deduction in house prices.
The last four columns in Table 7 summarize the e¤ect of a complete abolishment of the mortgage interest
deduction on house prices in the long run. A complete abolishment of the mortgage interest deduction in
the USA would, ceteris paribus, decrease the amount that people are able to pay by 10.48% and house prices
by 8.84%. The e¤ect is, however, larger in other countries where mortgage interest is deductible at higher
tax rates or interest-only loans are more popular. If the Belgian government changes the tax rate at which
households can deduct mortgage interest to zero, house prices would, ceteris paribus, decrease by 22.22%.12
In Denmark, the abolishment of the mortgage interest deduction would also decrease the advantage of the
repayment vehicle in the interest only loan: the result is an estimated decrease in house prices of 15.6%.
A similar change in the Netherlands would decrease house prices by almost 37%. The change in the Nether-
lands is so large because the rate at which mortgage interest is deductible is relatively high and the interest-
only loan with repayment vehicle becomes identical to the standard annuity mortgage (with maturity of 20
years) in this scenario. The change to a standard annuity mortgage with maturity of 20 years probably over-
states the e¤ect on house prices, as many households may borrow on 25 or 30 years instead of the assumed
20 years. On the other hand, the share of pure only-loans would likely decrease, such that the e¤ect on
house prices is underestimated. It would therefore be interesting to calculate the e¤ect on house prices from
the complete abolishment of mortgage interest deduction and a return to the standard annuity mortgage
for di¤erent maturities. These calculations are summarized in Table 8. In the Netherlands, the complete
abolishment of the mortgage interest deduction and a return to the standard annuity mortgage with maturity
of 30 years would reduce the amount that people are able to pay by 34.17% and house prices by 37.47%.
This scenario is of particular interest in the Netherlands: since 2013, only borrowers with standard annuity
mortgages and maturity of maximum 30 years are allowed to deduct mortgage interest. The maximum rate
at which mortgage interest is deductible will furthermore decrease by 0.5% every year until it is completely
abolished in 2040. Our framework indicates that the largest impact on the Dutch housing market will be
through the decreasing share of interest only loans. As government regulation induces households to pay
o¤ their mortgage debt since 2013, the largest e¤ect through changing mortgage characteristics will have
12The marginal tax rate of 54.92 provided by the OECD is an overestimation of the rate at which mortgage interest is scal
deductible. Assuming a marginal tax rate of 50%, house prices would decrease by 20.77% due to a complete abolishment of the
mortgage interest deduction in Belgium, ceteris paribus.
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an immediate impact (or is partially anticipated). The abolishment of the mortgage interest deduction is,
on the other hand, planned over a relatively long horizon such that income increases could be su¢ cient to
counteract the negative e¤ect of the reduction in mortgage interest deduction.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we develop a simple static framework in which households maximize their utility subject to
a budget constraint. The budget constraint is based on the observation that the average household faces
borrowing limits because most house-purchases are mortgage-nanced. Utility maximization of households,
the market clearing condition, and housing investment that absorbs changes in demand on the extensive
margin result in a relationship between house prices and the amount that households are able to pay. The
amount that households are able to pay is dependent on the share of mortgage payments to income (),
down payment ratio (), disposable income (Yt), mortgage length (n), and the interest rate (it). We extend
the model to allow for mortgage interest deduction such that the borrower is able to increase his mortgage
payments and ultimately the ability to pay. Furthermore, we model nancial innovations in the mortgage
market, such as interest-only loans with a repayment vehicle and pure interest-only loans, to capture the
di¤erent borrowing limits. This results in a relationship between house prices and a measure of adjusted
ability to pay that is also dependent upon the rate at which mortgage interest is scal deductible ( t) and
mortgage characteristics. We argue that standard cointegration tests are unable to reject the null hypothesis
of no cointegration between house prices and income alone due to changes in mortgage characteristics, the
interest rate and the rate at which mortgage interest is scally deductible.
We apply the model to a sample of 8 OECD countries and test for a long-run relationship between house
prices and ability to pay on the one hand and ability to pay adjusted for mortgage interest deduction and
mortgage characteristics on the other hand. Our results indicate that evidence for cointegration between
house prices and the standard measure of ability to pay is rather limited for every single country. When ability
to pay is adjusted for mortgage interest deduction and mortgage product innovation, the null hypothesis of
no cointegration is rejected in almost every country. Granger causality tests indicate that the measure of
adjusted ability to pay Granger causes house prices while evidence in the other direction is almost nonexistent.
This is important for the interpretation of the long-run relationship as it indicates that the statement that
high house prices cause product innovation and therefore more a¤ordable housing seems incorrect according
to the Granger causality tests.
To study the economic importance of ability to pay and its components, we estimate the elasticity of house
prices with respect to ability to pay. The average elasticity is 0.99, indicating that a one percentage increase
in adjusted ability to pay increases house prices with 0.99 percent on average in our sample of OECD
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countries. There is a whole discussion in the literature about the role of interest rates in housing bubbles
(see Glaeser, Gottlieb and Gyourko 2013 among others). Our model argues that the long-term nominal
interest rate explains a large part of house price increases. An important insight is that the semi interest
elasticity of ability to pay di¤ers between mortgage products. Countries with di¤erent mortgage products
will thus react di¤erently to interest-rate shocks. In our framework, the UKs house prices are more sensitive
to changes in interest rates due to the presence of interest-only loans and the inability to deduct mortgage
interest in recent years.
In any case, the model makes it possible to analyze house price changes for a whole range of scenarios. As
our long-run house price fundamental is empirically conrmed by almost 30 years of data in eight di¤erent
countries, our measure of ability to pay can be seen as a reliable long-run fundamental and provides an
intuitive alternative to standard house price models.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Cointegration tests
The Engle and Grangers ADF test involves estimating the following cointegration regression with yt and xt
integrated of order one, or I(1). In our analysis ph;i;t equals the nominal house price and xi;t our measure of
ability to pay in country i.
ph;i;t = 0;i + 1;ixi;t + ui;t
The null hypothesis is that the error term is I(1) (no cointegration). The alternative hypothesis is that
there exists a linear combination such that the residuals are stationary (cointegration). Hence the next step
involves applying the ADF test on the residuals:
u^i;t = (i   1) u^i;t 1 +
pX
z=1
i;zu^i;t z + i;t
We report two ADF test statistics. The rst is the standard t-statistic. As Engle and Granger (1987)
note, OLS seeks the linear combination that minimizes the residual variance and hence is more likely to be
stationary. Hence we use the appropriate critical values according to Mackinnon (1991, 1996) as reported
by the software package Eviews.
t^i =
^i   1
se(^i)
The second test statistic is based directly on the autocorrelation coe¢ cient after a correction such that the
limiting distribution does not depend on nuisance parameters controlling serial correlation (Hayashi 2000).
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z^i =
T (^i   1)
1 P ^
The Phillips and Ouliaris (1990) test statistics are related. These are non-parametric with respect to nuisance
parameters and hence they allow for a very wide range of time series models in which there is a unit root
(Phillips and Perron 1988). An estimate of i is obtained by regressing the unaugmented Dickey-Fuller
equation:
u^i;t = (i   1) u^i;t 1 + i;t
Two test statistics are then given by:
t^i =
(^i   1)  T ^i
 P
t u^
2
i;t 1
 1
se (^i)
z^i = T (^i   1) 
T 2^iP
t u^
2
i;t 1
Both test statistics allow for the e¤ects of serially correlated and heterogeneously distributed innovations
(Phillips and Perron 1988). The second term is an additional bias correction whose magnitude depends on
the strict one-sided long-run variance (^i) to capture the e¤ects of serial correlation.
8.2 Robustness check with gdp per capita
As a robustness check we calculate adjusted ability to pay with gdp per capita instead of disposable income
per capita. All results are available upon request. The results indicate that there exists a long-run relationship
between house prices and adjusted a¤ordability in Belgium, the Netherlands, United Kingdom, United States
of America, Norway and Denmark. We are, however, unable to reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration
in Sweden and Finland. The granger-causality tests provide strong evidence that the direction of causality
goes from adjusted a¤ordability to nominal house prices.
8.3 Graphical representation of assumptions
Figure A.3 presents the evolution of the tax rate at which mortgage interest is deductible, the share of
interest-only mortgages with a repayment vehicle, and the share of pure interest-only mortgages. Data
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sources and the construction of the time series are described in the Data section.
8.4 Graphical representation of the relative error term
Figure A.4 presents the relative error terms of a simple regression of house prices on adjusted a¤ordability.
The absolute error terms of these regressions are then divided by the dependent variable to construct the
relative error terms. Note that we apply the cointegration tests to the absolute errors, but represent the
relative errors here as they can be interpreted as percentage deviations from the long-run fundamental.
8.5 Ability to pay in Belgium
Given the complex and unique system of scal advantages for homeowners in Belgium, we choose to explain
our model for Belgium in the appendix to avoid di¢ culties of readability. We assume that the yearly mortgage
payments is equal to a fraction of income (Yt) plus the net scal advantage for homeowners (FAt) in the
initial year of the mortgage. The ability to pay for a household in Belgium thus equals:
A
0
t =
Yt + FAt
1   an;i
Before 2005, the scal advantage for homeowners was mainly based on capital payments. The part of the
mortgage that was eligible for the scal advantage was limited to a xed amount per household (LimitCPt).
Other limits were of minor importance to most households. The net tax relief (FAt) before 2005 was thus
equal to the marginal tax rate multiplied by the capital payments that were eligible for scal deduction:
FAt =  t

LimitCPt
an;i
  LimitCPt:it

Since 2005, each person is allowed to deduct an amount that depends on a combination of the capital
payments and interest payments. An average household with two earners is then able to deduct mortgage
payments up to a yearly limit (LimitWBt). The net scal advantage is then equal to FAt =  t:LimitWBt
since 2005. LimitCPt and LimitWBt are presented in Table A.2. The evolution of the net scal advantage
in the rst year of the mortgage (conditional on it; nt;  t and Yt) is then presented in Figure A.2.
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Table 1
Unit root tests of nominal house price and ability to pay (1980Q1-2009Q4)
C o u n t r y N om in a l H o u s e P r i c e A b i l i ty To P ay
B e lg iu m 0 .0 0 0 .0 0
N e t h e r la n d s 0 .0 3 0 .0 0
U n i t e d K in g d om 0 .0 2 0 .0 0
U n i t e d S t a t e s o f A m e r i c a 0 .0 7 0 .0 0
S w e d e n 0 .0 0 0 .0 0
N o rw ay 0 .0 0 0 .0 0
F in la n d 0 .0 1 0 .0 0
D e nm a rk 0 .0 0 0 .0 0
Note: H0: First di¤erence of nominal house price or ability to pay has a unit root according to Phillips-Perron
stationarity tests (including intercept). The results for ability to pay and ability to pay adjusted for mortgage
interest deduction and mortgage characteristics are exactly the same.
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Table 2
Cointegration Results: Nominal House Prices and Ability To Pay (1980Q1 - 2009Q4)
C o u n t r y A D F t ( S IC ) A D F z (S IC ) A D F t (A IC ) A D F z (A IC ) P O t P O z
B e lg ium
[0 .7 9 ] [ 0 .7 6 ] [ 0 .7 9 ] [ 0 .7 6 ] [ 0 .8 1 ] [ 0 .8 0 ]
N e t h e r la n d s
[0 .1 2 ] [ 0 .1 6 ] [ 0 .1 2 ] [ 0 .1 2 ] [ 0 .1 5 ] [ 0 .2 7 ]
U n i t e d K in g d om
[0 .2 6 ] [ 0 .1 9 ] [ 0 .2 6 ] [ 0 .1 9 ] [ 0 .5 2 ] [ 0 .4 7 ]
U n i t e d S t a t e s o f A m e r i c a x x x x x x
[0 .0 2 ] [ 0 .0 0 ] [ 0 .1 0 ] [ 0 .9 9 ] [ 0 .4 0 ] [ 0 .2 5 ]
S w e d e n
[0 .4 5 ] [ 0 .3 2 ] [ 0 .4 5 ] [ 0 .3 2 ] [ 0 .5 9 ] [ 0 .5 0 ]
N o rw ay x
[0 .2 0 ] [ 0 .1 0 ] [ 0 .6 7 ] [ 0 .2 0 ] [ 0 .4 7 ] [ 0 .3 9 ]
F in la n d
[0 .2 4 ] [ 0 .2 1 ] [ 0 .2 4 ] [ 0 .2 1 ] [ 0 .4 2 ] [ 0 .4 5 ]
D e nm a rk
[0 .2 9 ] [ 0 .2 3 ] [ 0 .2 9 ] [ 0 .2 3 ] [ 0 .5 0 ] [ 0 .4 9 ]
Note: The ADF and PO columns report the test results for the null hypothesis of no cointegration. x, xx and xxx
refer respectively to p-values lower than or equal to 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01. The p-values are in square brackets. The
optimal lag orders in the ADF tests are determined with the Schwarz (SIC) and Akaike (AIC) Information Criteria.
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Table 3
Cointegration results: nominal house prices and adjusted ability to pay (1980Q1-2009Q4)
C o u n t r y A D F t ( S IC ) A D F z (S IC ) A D F t (A IC ) A D F z (A IC ) P O t P O z
B e lg ium x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
[0 .0 2 ] [ 0 .0 1 ] [ 0 .0 2 ] [ 0 .0 1 ] [ 0 .0 3 ] [ 0 .0 2 ]
N e t h e r la n d s x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
[0 .0 1 ] [ 0 .0 0 ] [ 0 .0 2 ] [ 0 .0 0 ] [ 0 .0 7 ] [ 0 .0 5 ]
U n i t e d K in g d om x x
[0 .1 4 ] [ 0 .0 8 ] [ 0 .1 4 ] [ 0 .0 8 ] [ 0 .3 4 ] [ 0 .2 9 ]
U n i t e d S t a t e s o f A m e r i c a x x x x x x x x x x
[0 .0 3 ] [ 0 .0 0 ] [ 0 .0 4 ] [ 0 .0 0 ] [ 0 .2 9 ] [ 0 .1 8 ]
S w e d e n
[0 .5 0 ] [ 0 .3 7 ] [ 0 .5 0 ] [ 0 .3 7 ] [ 0 .5 8 ] [ 0 .5 0 ]
N o rw ay x x x x
[0 .1 1 ] [ 0 .0 4 ] [ 0 .1 1 ] [ 0 .0 4 ] [ 0 .3 9 ] [ 0 .3 0 ]
F in la n d x x x x
[0 .2 1 ] [ 0 .1 7 ] [ 0 .1 0 ] [ 0 .0 1 ] [ 0 .3 7 ] [ 0 .3 6 ]
D e nm a rk x x
[0 .1 2 ] [ 0 .0 9 ] [ 0 .1 2 ] [ 0 .0 9 ] [ 0 .2 9 ] [ 0 .2 8 ]
Note: The ADF and PO columns report the test results for the null hypothesis of no cointegration. x, xx and xxx
refer respectively to p-values lower than or equal to 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01. The p-values are in square brackets. The
optimal lag orders in the ADF tests are determined with the Schwarz (SIC) and Akaike (AIC) Information Criteria.
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Table 4
Granger causality (1980Q1 - 2009Q4)
H0: nominal house price does not granger cause adjusted ability to pay
C o u n t r y L a g s e l e c t io n
B e lg iu m x x x 2
[0 .0 1 ]
N e t h e r la n d s 3
[0 .1 2 ]
U n i t e d K in g d om x 2
[0 .0 7 ]
U n i t e d S t a t e s o f A m e r i c a x x 4
[0 .0 4 ]
S w e d e n 2
[0 .2 6 ]
N o rw ay x x x 2
[0 .0 1 ]
F in la n d 2
[0 .8 9 ]
D e nm a rk 2
[0 .7 4 ]
Note: x, xx and xxx refer respectively to p-values lower than or equal to 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01. The p-values are in
square brackets. The columns indicate the number of lags included (in quarters).
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Table 5
Granger causality (1980Q1 - 2009Q4)
H0: adjusted ability to pay does not granger cause nominal house price
C o u n t r y L a g s e l e c t io n
B e lg iu m x x x 2
[0 .0 0 ]
N e t h e r la n d s x x x 3
[0 .0 0 ]
U n i t e d K in g d om x x x 2
[0 .0 0 ]
U n i t e d S t a t e s o f A m e r i c a x x x 4
[0 .0 1 ]
S w e d e n x x 2
[0 .0 2 ]
N o rw ay x x x 2
[0 .0 0 ]
F in la n d x x x 2
[0 .0 0 ]
D e nm a rk x x x 2
[0 .0 0 ]
Note: x, xx and xxx refer respectively to p-values lower than or equal to 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01. The p-values are in
square brackets. The columns indicate the number of lags included (in quarters).
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Table 6
Elasticities of house prices with respect to ability to pay
SO L S D O L S (S IC ) D O L S (A IC )
C o u n t r y E la s t i c i ty E la s t i c i ty L a g s E la s t i c i ty L a g s
B e lg iu m 0 .9 3 0 .9 5 8 0 .9 5 8
( 0 .0 1 ) ( 0 .0 1 )
N e t h e r la n d s 1 .0 8 1 .1 0 8 1 .1 0 8
( 0 .0 2 ) ( 0 .0 2 )
U n i t e d K in g d om 1 .0 4 1 .0 4 5 1 .0 4 7
( 0 .0 4 ) ( 0 .0 4 )
U n i t e d S t a t e s o f A m e r i c a 0 .8 4 0 .8 4 7 0 .8 4 7
( 0 .0 2 ) ( 0 .0 2 )
S w e d e n 0 .9 7 0 .9 7 0 0 .9 7 8
( 0 .0 3 ) ( 0 .0 4 )
N o rw ay 1 .0 0 0 .9 9 6 0 .9 9 8
( 0 .0 4 ) ( 0 .0 4 )
F in la n d 0 .8 4 0 .8 2 5 0 .8 1 7
( 0 .0 5 ) ( 0 .0 5 )
D e nm a rk 1 .1 5 1 .1 6 2 1 .1 6 5
( 0 .0 5 ) ( 0 .0 5 )
M e a n g r o u p e s t im a t o r 0 .9 8 0 .9 8
( 0 .0 4 ) ( 0 .0 4 )
M e a n g r o u p e s t im a t o r 0 .9 9 0 .9 8
( e x c lu d in g sw e d e n ) ( 0 .0 5 ) ( 0 .0 5 )
Note: This table presents the estimated elasticities of house prices with respect to changes in adjusted ability to
pay. The elasticities are calculated from a static OLS regression or a dynamic OLS regression where the optimal
number of lags is selected with the Schwarz (SIC) or Akaike (AIC) information criterion. Standard errors (in
parentheses) are derived using the delta method.
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Table 7
Predicted e¤ects on ability to pay and house prices from changes in the interest rate and abolishment of
mortgage interest deduction
In t e r e s t r a t e Ta x r a t e
C o u n t r y O ld va lu e N ew va lu e
xi;t
xi;t
ph;i;t
p
h;i;t
O ld va lu e N ew va lu e
xi;t
xi;t
ph;i;t
p
h;i;t
B e lg iu m 3 .6 2 4 .6 2 - 9 .9 7 - 9 .4 3 5 4 .9 2 0 - 2 3 .5 1 - 2 2 .2 2
N e t h e r la n d s 3 .5 0 4 .5 0 - 1 6 .7 2 - 1 8 .3 3 4 0 .5 3 0 - 3 3 .6 4 - 3 6 .8 8
U n i t e d K in g d om 3 .7 4 4 .7 4 - 1 1 .4 9 - 1 1 .9 8 0 0 0 0
U n i t e d S t a t e s o f A m e r i c a 3 .4 6 4 .4 6 - 8 .5 8 - 7 .2 4 2 9 .3 8 0 - 1 0 .4 8 - 8 .8 4
S w e d e n 3 .2 6 4 .2 6 - 6 .6 6 - 6 .4 6 3 0 0 - 8 .2 0 - 7 .9 6
N o rw ay 4 .0 3 5 .0 3 - 6 .6 8 - 6 .6 3 2 8 0 - 9 .0 2 - 8 .9 6
F in la n d 3 .5 2 4 .5 2 - 6 .6 9 - 5 .5 0 2 9 0 - 8 .4 3 - 6 .9 2
D e nm a rk 3 .5 8 4 .5 8 - 5 .7 6 - 6 .6 6 3 3 0 - 1 3 .4 8 - 1 5 .6 0
Note: This table presents the e¤ect of a one percentage point increase in the interest rate, and a complete
abolishment of the ability to deduct mortgage interest on adjusted ability to pay (xi;t
xi;t
) and house prices (
ph;i;t
p
h;i;t
)
in 2009Q4. The e¤ect on house prices is equal to xi;t
xi;t
multiplied with the estimated elasticities from a DOLS
regression where the optimal number of lags is selected with the Schwarz Information Criterion.
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Table 8
Predicted e¤ects on ability to pay and house prices from abolishment of mortgage interest deduction and
change to standard annuity mortgage for di¤erent maturities
2 0 y e a r s 2 5 y e a r s 3 0 y e a r s O r ig in a l Va lu e s
C o u n t r y
xi;t
xi;t
ph;i;t
p
h;i;t
xi;t
xi;t
ph;i;t
p
h;i;t
xi;t
xi;t
ph;i;t
p
h;i;t
M a tu r i ty wRIO wPIO
B e lg iu m -3 3 .9 0 - 3 2 .0 5 - 2 3 .5 1 - 2 2 .2 2 - 1 4 .8 0 - 1 4 .0 0 2 5 0 0
N e t h e r la n d s - 4 9 .1 3 - 5 3 .8 8 - 4 1 .0 0 - 4 4 .9 7 - 3 4 .1 7 - 3 7 .4 7 2 0 3 9 5 0
U n i t e d K in g d om -1 6 .4 5 - 1 7 .1 5 - 3 .5 2 - 3 .6 7 7 .2 4 7 .5 4 2 5 6 1 1
U n i t e d S t a t e s o f A m e r i c a - 2 6 .4 7 - 2 2 .3 2 - 1 4 .6 7 - 1 2 .3 7 - 4 .7 1 - 3 .9 7 2 7 0 0
S w e d e n -8 .2 0 - 7 .9 6 6 .9 3 6 .7 2 1 9 .8 2 1 9 .2 3 2 0 0 0
N o rw ay -9 .0 2 - 8 .9 6 4 .5 2 4 .4 9 1 5 .6 4 1 5 .5 3 2 0 0 0
F in la n d -8 .4 3 - 6 .9 2 6 .1 5 5 .0 5 1 8 .4 2 1 5 .1 2 2 0 0 0
D e nm a rk - 1 3 .4 8 - 1 5 .6 0 0 .1 9 0 .2 2 1 1 .6 5 1 3 .4 8 2 0 5 2 0
Note: This table presents the e¤ect of a complete abolishment of the ability to deduct mortgage interest and change
to a standard annuity mortgage for di¤erent maturities on adjusted ability to pay (xi;t
xi;t
) and house prices (
ph;i;t
p
h;i;t
)
in 2009Q4. The e¤ect on house prices is equal to xi;t
xi;t
multiplied with the estimated elasticities from a DOLS
regression where the optimal number of lags is selected with the Schwarz Information Criterion.
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Table A.1
House price indices
C o u n t r y S o u r c e S e r i e s
B e lg iu m N a t io n a l B a n k o f B e lg iu m R e s id e n t ia l p r o p e r ty p r i c e s , e x i s t in g d w e l l in g s , w h o le c o u n t r y
N e t h e r la n d s K a d a s t e r In d ic e d e s p r ix im m o b i l i e r s
U n i t e d K in g d om D ep a r tm e n t fo r C om m u n i t i e s a n d L o c a l G ov e rnm en t M ix - a d ju s t e d h o u s e p r i c e in d e x
U n i t e d S t a t e s o f A m e r i c a Fe d e r a l H o u s in g F in a n c e A g e n c y (F H FA ) P u r ch a s e a n d a l l - t r a n s a c t io n s in d ic e s
S w e d e n S t a t i s t i c s S w e d e n R e a l e s t a t e p r i c e in d e x fo r o n e - a n d tw o -d w e l l in g b u i ld in g s f o r p e rm a n e n t l iv in g
N o rw ay S t a t i s t i c s N o rw ay H o u s e p r i c e in d e x
F in la n d T i la s t o k e s k u s P r i c e o f d w e l l in g s
D e nm a rk S t a tB a n k P r i c e in d e x fo r s a l e s o f p r o p e r ty
Source: Girouard, N., M. Kennedy, P. van den Noord, and C. André 2006
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Table A.2
Limits to the loan amount that was eligible for scal deduction of capital payments and the net tax relief
since 2005 in Belgium.
Ye a r LimitCP t LimitWBt
1 9 8 0 - 1 9 8 8 4 9 5 7 8 .7
1 9 8 9 5 4 5 3 6 .5 8
1 9 9 0 5 6 2 2 2 .2 5
1 9 9 1 5 8 1 8 0 .6 1
1 9 9 2 - 1 9 9 8 5 9 9 9 0 .2 3
1 9 9 9 6 0 5 6 0 .3 9
2 0 0 0 6 1 2 2 9 .7
2 0 0 1 6 3 3 2 0
2 0 0 2 6 4 8 8 0
2 0 0 3 6 5 9 5 0
2 0 0 4 6 7 0 0 0
2 0 0 5 4 9 8 0
2 0 0 6 5 1 4 0
2 0 0 7 5 2 0 0
2 0 0 8 5 4 4 0
2 0 0 9 5 5 4 0
Source: Van der Reysen, Vanrijckeghem and Vlasselaerts 2007
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Table A.3
Elasticities of house prices with respect to adjusted ability to pay
SO L S D O L S (S IC ) D O L S (A IC )
C o u n t r y E la s t i c i ty E la s t i c i ty L e a d s L a g s E la s t i c i ty L e a d s L a g s
B e lg iu m 0 .9 3 0 .9 4 1 7 0 .9 3 8 7
( 0 .0 1 ) ( 0 .0 1 )
N e t h e r la n d s 1 .0 8 1 .1 4 8 8 1 .1 4 8 8
( 0 .0 2 ) ( 0 .0 2 )
U n i t e d K in g d om 1 .0 4 1 .0 5 0 5 1 .0 5 0 7
( 0 .0 4 ) ( 0 .0 4 )
U n i t e d S t a t e s o f A m e r i c a 0 .8 4 0 .8 4 3 5 0 .8 5 3 7
( 0 .0 2 ) ( 0 .0 2 )
S w e d e n 0 .9 7 0 .9 7 0 0 0 .9 5 8 0
( 0 .0 4 ) ( 0 .0 4 )
N o rw ay 1 .0 0 0 .9 9 0 6 0 .9 8 2 8
( 0 .0 5 ) ( 0 .0 5 )
F in la n d 0 .8 4 0 .8 0 0 5 0 .8 0 0 7
( 0 .0 5 ) ( 0 .0 5 )
D e nm a rk 1 .1 5 1 .1 7 0 2 1 .1 7 0 5
( 0 .0 5 ) ( 0 .0 6 )
M e a n g r o u p e s t im a t o r 0 .9 9 0 .9 8
( 0 .0 5 ) ( 0 .0 5 )
M e a n g r o u p e s t im a t o r 0 .9 9 0 .9 9
( e x c lu d in g sw e d e n ) ( 0 .0 5 ) ( 0 .0 5 )
Note: This table presents the estimated elasticities of house prices with respect to changes in adjusted ability to
pay. The elasticities are calculated from a static OLS regression or a dynamic OLS regression where the optimal
number of leads and lags is selected with the Schwarz (SIC) or Akaike (AIC) information criterion. Standard errors
(in parentheses) are derived using the delta method.
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Figure 1
Decomposition of changes in ability to pay
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Figure A.1
Nominal house prices and adjusted ability to pay
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Figure A.2
Net scal advantage (EUR) in Belgium
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Figure A.3
Graphical representation of assumptions
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Figure A.4
Graphical representation of the relative error terms
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